has been made towards Army-wide implementation of the policy. If this is not addressed, the new 2012 Total Force Policy will follow the same long road and fail while waiting for the essential actions to be taken to effectively implement it. This paper applies Kotter's eight-stage process of creating major change to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the Total Force Policy implementation efforts. The resulting analysis yields an alarming lack of consideration for the fundamental requirements for successful implementation of change. Implementation actions to date are sporadic and provide a weak foundation for policy goals to be attained. The Total Force Policy lacks steadfast leadership commitment at all levels across the components. There is not a clearly communicated vision to motivate the force to take action in a unified direction, and cultural differences between the components present barriers to implementation of even the best initiatives. Strategies to address these issues are provided, as well as the recommendation to utilize Kotter's methodology to develop a comprehensive revision of the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy.
A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy
Reserve Affairs' success will be measured by the degree to which we have advanced a culture of mutual appreciation and confidence in both active and reserve components. 2 The basis of the directive is that "DoD policies require the military departments to organize, man, train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities." 3 The recent Army Directive lays out implementation actions that reflect strategies to resolve issues identified through lessons learned during the army's decade at war utilizing and integrating the active and reserve components as one operational force.
These implementation actions are necessary steps for the management of successful integration of the active and reserve component. What is lacking, and what has been lacking since the inception of the Total Force Policy is an effective mechanism to lead the Army through the transition to a total force. Additionally, one of the biggest challenges to successful and effective implementation of the Total Force Policy is, as 2 reflected in Secretary Dennis McCarthy's quote above, establishing a culture of mutual appreciation and confidence between the components. These cultural differences between the components must be understood so that they are no longer impediments to mutual appreciation and support.
The Army leadership is applying lessons learned from previous force reductions, as well as over ten years of combat operations in an attempt to maintain operational readiness and avoid becoming a hollow force. The complex environment in which we live today is very different than when Secretary Laird envisioned the Total Force concept, but the underlying principle of the Total Force remains unchanged: the nation can maintain defense capabilities at a reduced total cost through careful balance of active component and reserve component forces. 4 The reserve components play a vital role in the structure of the future force. 12 In some cases the military skips some or all of the initial four stages of the transformation process, as will be demonstrated in the following assessment. The downside to skipping these initial stages is that it produces change efforts that come across as being forced, and often seem to lack logical reasoning. If the transformation does not make sense, everyone from the private to senior leadership will create roadblocks to derail the transformation effort. Change can only be successfully implemented if these roadblocks or barriers to change are effectively addressed. The Army is not immune to the impact of these roadblocks. Lack of teamwork, low level of trust, competing demands for resources, deep-seated culture, and a simple unwillingness to change are just a few examples of barriers. Any barrier that affects the successful implementation of change to the organization must be addressed. 13 Kotter's eight stages are discussed below in more detail, and used to examine the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy to date. The stages are consecutive and movement to the next stage should not happen until the requirements of the current/previous stage(s) have been met. 14 For the purpose of this paper, all stages will be discussed as if the requirements of the previous stages were met. This examination 6 of implementation efforts will inform the recommendations in this paper to facilitate implementation of the Total Force Policy.
Stage One -Establishing a Sense of Urgency
Establishing a sense of urgency primarily addresses the need to motivate people to let go of the status quo and drive them out of their comfort zone. 15 People within an organization get comfortable with the way things are done and the Army is no exception. From initial entry into the Army, Soldiers are guided by regulations and manuals that set standards for behavior and define processes for performing tasks.
People at the top make the rules and the people at the bottom follow the rules. This can be an effective way of maintaining order and discipline, but is not an effective way to modify engrained cultural views and opinions that exist between the components. In order to support effective implementation of the Total Force Policy, the Army leader needs to reorient attitudes and actions that keep them locked into the current way of thinking and doing things. 16 Numerous attempts via policies, directives and transformation efforts have been made over the years to create a sense of urgency.
But major transformation cannot happen if the sense of urgency does not exist at all levels. The transformation effort needs to be presented as an initiative that solicits support and involvement from all ranks.
The Total Force Policy has been a policy for almost forty years, and has yet to be fully and effectively implemented. Even though a change of this magnitude does not happen quickly, by anyone's standards four decades is too long to implement a policy.
This is not to say there has been a lack of effort to implement the policy. As discussed later in this paper, there have been a number of secretaries of defense who have directed efforts to support the Total Force Policy. While these efforts are necessary to 7 justify activities, programs and funding, change will not happen until the Army has truly created a sense of urgency across components and down to the lowest level. Simply stated, the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy have lacked a sense of urgency over the years. A more accurate statement might be that the policy has had a sporadic sense of urgency. Either way, the change effort will lose momentum if the sense of urgency is not maintained. 17 Current fiscal challenges and restructuring of the force will create a sense of urgency at the Department of Defense level, but also creates competition for resources and relevancy as the components guard their dwindling resources.
There is still a great cultural divide between the active and reserve components. Stage Three -Developing a Vision and Strategy
According to Kotter, a vision needs to be created to help direct the change effort.
Every vision should be accompanied by a strategy to lay out how it will be achieved. The goal of this stage is to empower people to take action. Empowerment of broad based action cannot occur until obstacles to change are removed. 34 The Army has done much over the years to implement policies to enable change and address obstacles that impact successful implementation of the Total Force Policy. Incompatible structures, legacy systems, deficiencies in skills and lack of support at all levels present obstacles to implementation of the Total Force Policy. change made in the organization is not anchored in the culture, it will not be strong enough to withstand the natural tendency to go back to doing things the old way. The most successful changes can easily be reversed or forgotten if the change does not become rooted in the culture. 46 As an example, continuum of service relies on anchoring changes in culture.
Continuum of service facilitates the transition of Soldiers between active and reserve components. Current continuum of service efforts focus on making the policy changes necessary to make the transition between components easier. 47 Another challenge is to overcome the negative stigma of transferring from the active component to serve in the reserve component. Time spent in the reserve component is currently viewed in a negative light by many active component Soldiers. Army culture must change in order to make this a successful initiative. The point here is that the process can be set in place, but until the culture adopts the initiative as one that is not detrimental to the Soldier's career, it will not be generally accepted as a smart career option.
Policy Recommendations
The foregoing analysis applied Kotter Implementation has been the primary barrier to attaining the goals of the Total Force
Policy. The Army should conduct a comprehensive revision to its implementation efforts
